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Abstract
Since 1960, transport costs have been falling, but international exchange did not be-
come less sensitive to distance. We propose the following explanation for this puzzle:
in a Dixit-Stiglitz framework, a decrease in transport cost favors trade, which may
increase the international specialization (i.e. the number of varieties of intermediate
goods used in production). An increased international specialization increases the
need for coordination, and makes relatively more important for downstream firms
to be close to their suppliers. As a result, trade increases with all partners, but more
quickly for neighbors than for distant countries.
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Introduction
The distance puzzle has been widely discussed in the literature since Leamer
and Medberry (1993) shed light on it. This puzzle simply says that “the world
is not getting smaller”: distance still matters to account for trade despite de-
clining trade costs. There are two measures to quantify the impact of distance
on trade: elasticity of trade to distance and the distance of trade (DOT). The
most commonly used is elasticity of trade to distance derived from the stan-
dard gravity equation. The second measure, proposed by Carre`re and Schiff
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(2005), is defined as an average distance between trade partners weighted by
trade volumes. One would expect globalization to result in a decreasing sen-
sitivity of trade to distance i.e. decreasing distance coefficient and increasing
DOT over time. However, most studies show increasing or constant distance
coefficients (among others Leamer and Medberry (1993), Brun et al. (2005),
Disdier and Head (2008), Berthelon and Freund (2008)) and decreasing or
constant trends of DOT over these last decades (Carre`re and Schiff (2005),
Berthelon and Freund (2008)).
Several explanations have been proposed in the literature which can be clas-
sified into 5 categories, related to : 1) the interpretation of the distance co-
efficient, 2) changes in the geography of production, 3) the multiplication of
Regional Trade Agreements (RTA), 4) the compositional effect and 5) the
emergence and the evolution of different components of trade costs, defined in
a broader way than pure transport costs.
Our paper contributes to this literature by proposing a new theoretical expla-
nation to this puzzle, that belongs to the fifth category. More precisely, our
explanation is in line with the one developed by Duranton and Storper (2008).
They show that the increased sensitivity of trade to distance can emerge from
a fall in transport through a quality effect. They show that a fall in trans-
port costs provides firms with incentives to produce higher quality goods and
they assume that higher quality are more expansive to exchange. This latter
assumption is related to the idea that within an incomplete contract envi-
ronment, the exchange of higher quality goods requires more coordination
between the supplier and the buyer. As a result, the relationship between
pure transport costs and global transfer costs (including coordination costs) is
non monotonic. On the decreasing part of this relationship, a fall in transport
costs increases the need of proximity with the firm’s suppliers.
The explanation presented in this paper shares with Duranton and Storper’s
two important characteristics: i) the relationship between transport cost and
trade cost is not necessarily monotonic, ii) this phenomenon arises from con-
tract incompleteness. However, the mechanism that we underline is quite dif-
ferent: in our model, based on a Dixit-Stiglitz increasing return to scale tech-
nology, a fall in transport costs may increase the international division of
labor. In this framework, the increasing international division of labor can be
interpreted as an increasing specialization of intermediate goods. As a conse-
quence, we assume that production processes become more complex (this is
the complexity effect), which in turn implies that input-output linkages require
a higher level of coordination. Such a coordination is easier between neighbors
than between very distant countries. As a result, trade increases with all part-
ners, but more quickly for neighbors than for distant countries. Contrarily to
Duranton and Storper’s, our model predicts an increase in the distance puzzle
in the long run (i.e. for low transport costs).
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 1 presents and discusses
several attempts to solve this puzzle, section 2 presents a micro model of co-
ordination cost, section 3 introduces this micro model in a general equilibrium
model of international trade, section 4 presents the results, and especially the
possible emergence of distance puzzle at the equilibrium. The final section
concludes.
1 Is the distance puzzle still puzzling?
In this section, we present and discuss several attempts to solve the distance
puzzle, following the 5 categories presented in introduction 4 .
The interpretation of the distance coefficient:
Coe et al. (2002) highlight two different interpretations of the distance coeffi-
cient which could explain the trend of estimated distance coefficient. The first
interpretation is based on the basic definition of the distance coefficient in
gravity equation since Deardoff (1998) and Anderson & van Wincoop (2001).
Following this definition, the distance coefficient is the product of the elastic-
ity of trade to trade costs with the elasticity of trade costs to distance, and
the latter is equal to the ratio of marginal trade cost to the average one. Then,
the constant trend of distance coefficient could be explained by a proportional
fall in both marginal and average trade costs and, similarly, the increasing
trend (in absolute value) would be explained by a deeper fall in marginal
trade costs than average costs. However, as pointed out by Coe et al. (2002),
data on transport costs does not allow to differentiate these two components
of transport costs, making its empirical validation difficult to assess.
The second interpretation of the distance coefficient states that not only bi-
lateral trade costs matter but also trade costs between all others potential
partners. Indeed, if transport costs with neighbor countries fall relatively more
than transport costs with distant countries, then transport costs would favor
trade with neighbors. The basic way to account for this effect is in introducing
a multilateral resistance term 5 . However, according to Coe et al. (2002), this
effect does not seem to explain the distance puzzle, suggesting that transport
costs with distant countries have fall more than transport costs with neigh-
bors ones. Despite this latter result, Brun et al. (2005) show that it allow to
reduce the scope of the distance puzzle 6 . Finally, Buch et al. (2004) argue
4 We leave aside the methodological aspect of the debate. See, for instance, Coe
et al. (2007) and Archanskaia and Daudin (2010).
5 Since the seminal papers of Deardorff (1998) and Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003) on this issue.
6 For instance, introducing the multilateral resistance term, Brun et al. (2005)
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that distance coefficient in gravity equations should be interpreted in terms of
changes in distance costs. They explain the stable trend of distance coefficient
over time by a proportional fall in distance costs. However, this explanation
implies that trade costs are linear to distance which seems to be invalidate
by the fact that transport costs with distant countries have fallen more than
transport costs with neighbor ones (Dias (2010)). Moreover, a proportional
fall in trade cost does not mean a proportional fall in the transport cost pa-
rameter, which is equal to the ad valorem trade cost plus one. Basically, if the
transport cost parameter is 2.2 for a distant country and 1.1 for a neighbor
country, then a proportional fall in transport cost means that the new coef-
ficients must be, e.g., 1.6 and 1.05, and not 1.6 and 0.8. So the ratio of both
parameters tends to 1 when transport costs keep on falling.
The evolving geography of production:
Leamer and Levinsohn (1995) have been the first to suggest that the dramatic
increase in trade flows could be due to a more dispersed repartition of GDP
around the world rather than to a dramatic fall in transport costs. It follows
that the constant distance coefficient is not puzzling, because the increase in
global trade does not reveal a fall in transport costs. However, evidence from
Hummels (2007) indicates that ad valorem transport costs have experienced
a fall of about 25% between 1974 and 2004. This should indeed have made
trade less sensitive to distance.
More recently, a few studies have tried to explain the trend of DOT with a sim-
ilar argument. For instance, Carre`re and Schiff (2005) showed that distance of
trade (DOT) within countries of South-East Asia have sharply decreased while
several countries in the neighborhood has been developing. Finally, Berthelon
and Freund (2008) have provided theoretical estimation of DOT, between 1985
and 2005, in a frictionless world, in order to account for the impact of dis-
persion of economic activities on DOT. They show 7 that actual DOT are
significantly correlated with theoretical ones but they are also significantly
smaller, suggesting that, given changes in GDP over the period, DOT should
have increased more than it did.
The impact of Regional Trade Agreements:
Another way to look at the distance puzzle is to analyze the impact of Re-
gional Trade Agreements (RTA) on DOT. Indeed, trade agreements enhance
trade between countries that are geographically close (since those agreements
are usually settled between neighbors), then it could lower DOT of countries
without reflecting an increasing sensitivity of goods to distance. This effect was
observe constant distance coefficient between 1962 and 1996 rather than decreasing
without this latter effect.
7 See Berthelon and Freund (2008) Fig. 1, pp.314.
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studied by Carre`re and Schiff (2005) for eight free trade area for the period
1962-2000. They found an average effect of RTA on the trend of DOT equal to
−0.20%. However, they also highlighted that the share of countries experienc-
ing an increase in DOT is twice larger inside those trade blocs. On the other
hand, when Coughlin (2004) studied the impact of NAFTA on Amercian trade
flows, he noted that since the creation of NAFTA, while amercian exports with
NAFTA members (i.e. Canada and Mexico) have increased. The same applied
for Asian countries, whereas exports with non-member Latin-American coun-
tries decreased despite their geographical proximity. They suggest that these
changes in Amercian exports are not only due to NAFTA creation but also to
economic growth. Indeed, during this period Canada, Mexico and Asia were
among fastest growing countries in the world whereas Latin America were not
(Coughlin (2004)). Archanskaia and Daudin (2010) argue that controlling for
the RTA can explain the distance puzzle. Indeed, using a balanced panel of
trading partners 8 they show that RTA could explain the puzzle. However, as
suggested by authors estimation of RTA can be biased because of the potential
endogeneity of RTA (Fontagne´ and Zignago (2007)).
The compositional effect:
The fourth explanation is related to a compositional effect: the sensitivity of
distance would have decreased for each type of good, but the share of goods
that are more sensitive to distance would have increased. Disdier and Head
(2008) suggest this effect could explain the distance puzzle. However, Berth-
elon and Freund (2008) did not confirm empirically this effect. Indeed they
showed that the increase in the average coefficient of distance in gravity equa-
tions between 1985-89 and 2001-04 is due to the increase in the coefficient
of distance for 40% sectors 9 . Siliverstovs and Schumacher (2008) have also
investigated the distance puzzle at both aggregate and disaggregate levels.
They show that while the distance puzzle holds using aggregate data, it does
not at a disaggregate level, suggesting that changes are compensated at the
aggregate level. Thus, the compositional effect seems to explain the puzzle.
However, differences between these two papers could come from the fact that
the country sample used by the latter is smaller (22 for the latter vs 73 for
the former) and composed of more homogeneous countries, as emphasized by
Siliverstovs and Schumacher (2008). Archanskaia and Daudin (2010) provide
estimation controlling for the compositional effect. This effect appears to ex-
plain a decrease of trade elasticities over time, while, at the aggregate level,
trade elasticities are constant.
8 This balanced panel of trading partners allow them to control for the creation of
new countries in the nineties following the dissolution of USSR.
9 They linked this increased coefficient with the level of substituability of goods:
homogenous goods are more sensitive to the distance than differentiated ones.
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On the evolution of different components of trade costs:
Grossman (1998) argues that trade elasticities are too important in magnitude
to account only for transport costs. This suggests that trade costs have to be
defined in a broader way in order to encompass other components that affect
trade and follow different patterns 10 .
In Brun et al. (2005) trade costs encompass the real oil price, the level of
infrastructure and the real exchange rate, and allow them to find decreasing
elasticities of trade to distance of about 11% between 1962 and 1996. However,
this evidence of globalization appears to be limited to “rich countries”. Dias
(2010) obtains similar conclusion despite the different framework used. Indeed,
he proposed to account for three distinct aspects of globalization i.e. changes in
transport costs, unrelated-distance trade costs (proxied by tariffs) and barriers
to production decentralization (proxied by FDI). He concludes that unrelated-
distance trade costs has the most significant impact on distance elasticity,
suggesting that a fall in unrelated-distance trade costs favors more remote
countries whereas a fall in trade costs related to distance favors countries that
have more central geographical position.
Krautheim (2007) and Duranton and Storper (2008) differ in their explana-
tion from the previous in the fact that other components of transfer costs can
evolve endogenously is response to an improvement in transport technology.
Specifically, Krautheim (2007) considered that information affects exporta-
tions. Within a framework of heterogeneous firms, he introduces the possibil-
ity for firms, within a country, to create a network in order to facilitate the
exchange of information. Then, trade flows are affected to distance through
two different mechanisms: 1) firms engaged in trade with closer countries expe-
rienced higher trade flows (this is the intensive margin), and 2) lower distance
between two countries {i, j} increases the number of firms exporting from i
to j (this is the extensive margin). Creation of informational network allows
to explain both the high level of trade elasticities and their increase through
the following mechanism: exogenous increase in network quality creates more
incentives for firms to export with all its partners but relatively more with
its closer partners than its distant ones. As a consequence, trade elasticities
increase.
Duranton and Storper (2008) propose an alternative explanation that accounts
10 Notice that several papers highlight the emergence of new constraints in trade
which could counterbalanced the fall in transport costs. Among them, Hummels
(2001) reported that each day spent in transit reduced the value of merchandise
of about 0,8%, Fink et al. (2005) estimated that a halving of communication costs
(proxied bilateral calling price) could lead to a 42.5% increase in bilateral trade.
On the other hand, Stein and Daude (2007) observed that differences in time zones
appear to reduce trade and FDI.
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for the exchange of information but with respect to intermediate goods char-
acteristics. Their argument can be summarized as follows: a lower transport
cost allows firms to trade higher quality goods. But those goods are more
expansive to trade, since the transfer cost of good is an increasing function
of their quality. Formally, let ζ be the share of the quality Q of a machine
that is lost in transport. Assume this quality is measured in terms of labor
used in the production of the machine. If the willingness to pay for a machine
is Q1−ψ (ψ ∈]0; 1[), it is easy to check that the profit-maximizing quality is[
(1−ζ)1−ψ(1−ψ)
ω
]1/ψ
, where ω is the wage rate. This expression is decreasing in
ζ. Transfer cost is simply the amount of that quality that is lost in transport,
ie ζ
[
(1−ζ)1−ψ(1−ψ)
ω
]1/ψ
, which is a reverted-U shaped function of ζ. Within this
framework, the distance puzzle would only apply for high transport costs. As
a result, the long-run prediction of this model is that this puzzle will disappear
if ζ → 0.
Our model tells a similar story than Duranton and Storper’s. However it differs
with respect to the nature of the relationship. Similarly to Duranton and
Storper, we find that the relationship between transport cost and transfer
cost is non necessarily monotonic. However, our model differs in terms of long
run prediction. Indeed, we show that the distance puzzle could be strengthened
for very low level of transport cost.
2 Coordination cost in input-output linkages
Assume a downstream firm needs a component from an upstream firm. This
component can be describe as a set of characteristics: color, material, size of
the first, second (...) subcomponent, and so forth. In a world of perfect con-
tracts, the downstream firm would be able to describe perfectly the required
characteristics, and the upstream firm would build an intermediate good per-
fectly fitting this description. In the world of incomplete contracts New New
trade theory (NNTT) focuses on, however, the downstream firm is likely to
observe a distance between the optimal set of characteristics and the actual
one. Let z be this distance, measured in an appropriate metrics. Clearly, z
is a random variable. We assume that g(z), its density function, follows the
following exponential law:
g (z) = γe−γz
with z > 0 the expected value of z is then E(z) = 1/γ. In this paper, we
focus on two determinants of z: geographical distance between upstream and
downstream firms, and the complexity of the production process in which the
intermediate good is included. Let d be the geographical distance, and N the
number of different varieties of intermediate goods used by the downstream
firm, which is a proxy for the complexity of the production process. The ex-
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pected distance E(z) increases with both N and d:
γ = 1/φ (N, d)
with:
∂φ (N, d)
∂N
> 0;
∂φ (N, d)
∂d
> 0
The distance between the required characteristics and the actual ones is costly
for the downstream firm. This cost is what we call ’coordination cost’, even
though it is not a cost meant to increase the coordination, but a cost that
arises from the lack of coordination. We assume it is proportional both to the
price of the intermediate pI and to z. So, if z is expressed in a correctly chosen
unit, the expected coordination cost per unit of intermediate writes pIφ (N, d).
Besides this coordination cost, the downstream firms have to bear a transport
cost. We assume that this transport cost is an iceberg cost, that increases
the cost by pIθd, where θ > 0 is a parameter that denotes the transport
technology. This means that a fall in transport cost will be modeled as a fall
in θ 11 .
Finally, the expected cost of using one unit of intermediate is pI (φ (N, d) + θd+ 1).
In the subsequent, we assume that firms are risk-neutral, so we think in terms
of expected values.
3 International trade
The world is composed of four identical countries. Each country has one neigh-
bor and two distant partners. The distance between two neighbors is d > 0,
whereas d = γd (γ > 1) is the distance between distant partners. Figure 1
pictures what such a world could look like, where the lines represent the roads
between the countries.
Fig. 1. The 4-country world
11 since the geographical distance between two regions scarcely decreases.
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We choose a 4-country because a 3-country model would not allow to have a
perfect symmetry between countries 12 .
In each country, a representative consumer maximizes her utility function
U = x1−µA X
µ (µ ∈]0; 1[) where xA is her consumption of an agricultural good
produced with constant return to scale, and X is an industrial good. Let the
agricultural good be the numeraire, P be the price of the industrial good and y
the country’s gdp. The budget constraint writes y = xA+PX and the optimal
consumption of both goods is given by
xA = (1− µ) y
X = µ
y
P
The agricultural sector employs LA workers. The production function is simply
xA = ALA (A > 0), so the wage rate is ω = A. In the industrial sector, a
representative firm transforms a continuum of intermediate goods into a final
good, with a CES aggregator:
X(σ−1)/σ =
4∑
k=1
nk∫
0
x
(σ−1)/σ
i,k di
where σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between two varieties, nk is
the number of varieties produced in country k and xi,k is the quantity of
intermediate good of variety i produced in country k and consumed locally 13 .
The firm minimizes the production cost:
n1∫
0
xi,1pi,1di+ τ−
n2∫
0
xi,2pi,2di+ τ¯
 n3∫
0
xi,3pi,3di+
n4∫
0
xi,4pi,4di
 (1)
where pi,k is the price of variety i produced in country k and τ− and τ¯ are
the iceberg transfer costs for, respectively, neighbor and distant countries.
Following the ideas of the previous section, we define those transfer costs as:
τ− = 1 + θd− + φ(N, d−)
τ¯ = 1 + θd¯+ φ(N, d¯)
12 In a 3-country model, either the three countries form an equilateral triangle so
we can’t analyze the impact of distance, either one country has to be different from
the others.
13 We do not use an index for the importing country because of the symmetry
between countries.
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with θ > 0 and N ≡ 4∑
k=1
nk. θ reflects the transport technology and N the
complexity of the production process. The cost-minimization program gives
the demand for an individual variety i: xi = (piτi)
−σ cσX where τi is the
appropriate transfer cost (that depends on the exporting country) and where:
c ≡
 n1∫
0
p1−σi,1 di+ τ−
1−σ
n2∫
0
p1−σi,2 di+ τ¯
1−σ
 n3∫
0
p1−σi,3 di+
n4∫
0
p1−σi,4 di
1/(σ−1)
Replacing the optimal value of xi into expression 1 gives the cost function
C(X) = cX. Since the final good sector is competitive, the price equates the
marginal cost, so P = c.
Each firm in the intermediate good sector produces with a fix cost f : xi =
LX − f where LX is the number of workers employed in one such firm. The
monopolistic power allows those firms to apply a markup to the marginal cost,
so the price is given by:
p = ω
σ
σ − 1 = A
σ
σ − 1
This pricing applies for every variety in every country, so the price of the final
good writes:
P =
[
N
4
(
Aσ
σ − 1
)1−σ
+
N
4
(
Aσ
σ − 1
)1−σ
τ−
1−σ +
N
2
(
Aσ
σ − 1
)1−σ
τ¯ 1−σ
]1/(1−σ)
=
(
N
4
)1/(1−σ) ( Aσ
σ − 1
)(
1 + τ−
1−σ + 2τ¯ 1−σ
)1/(1−σ)
Let x0 be the demand of a typical variety produced locally and x− and x¯ the
demands of typical varieties produced, respectively in the neighbor country
and in a distant one. Those demands write:
x0 =
(
Aσ
σ − 1
)−σ
P σ−1µy
x− = x
0τ−
−σ
x¯ = x0τ¯−σ
(2)
Since the distance puzzle is the focus of this paper, we will be interested in
the impact of a fall in θ, the pure transport cost, on the ratio x¯
x−
, namely the
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ratio of distant exchange to neighbor exchange. The distance puzzle will arise
in the model if this ratio decreases when θ decreases. Next section will address
this question. for now, we just notice that x¯
x−
=
( τ−
τ¯
)σ
, so we can alternatively
focus on the ratio of both transfer costs.
Classically, in monopolistic competition, the appearance of news varieties pre-
vents any non zero profit. This change in the number of varieties is, indeed,
central in the argument of the paper. But for now, we focus on the short-run
equilibrium, where N is given and thus where the profit of a typical firm can
be non zero. Let pi be this profit. It writes:
pi =
(
x0 + x− + 2x¯
)(
A
σ − 1
)
− Af (3)
Equation 3 gives the profit as a function of x ≡ x0 + x− + 2x¯, and equations 2
gives x as a function of the gdp y 14 . y is simply the sum of the wages earned
by the workers and of the profits earned by the shareholders of the N/4 firms:
y = AL+
N
4
pi = AL+
N
4
[(
x0 + x− + 2x¯
)(
A
σ − 1
)
− Af
]
(4)
Using equations 2, 3 and 4 allows to solve for x:
x =
(σ − 1)µ
(
4L
N
− f
)
(Bσ − µ)
where:
B ≡
(
1 + τ−
1−σ + 2τ¯ 1−σ
)
(
1 + τ−−σ + 2τ¯−σ
)
Finally, on equilibrium, labor demand must equate labor supply:
N
4
(x+ f) + LA = L
14 and of the price P , which is solved for since we take, for now, N as given.
11
4 The distance puzzle
Previous section dealt with the short-run equilibrium, where N is assumed
constant and where pi is allowed to be non-zero. The argument of this paper is
that the fall in transport costs leads to an increased complexity of production
processes, via an increase in N . Thus, this argument relies on the long-run
equilibrium of the model, where the number of varieties N is allowed to move
and where zero-profit condition applies:
pi = x
A
σ − 1 − Af =
µ
(
4L
N
− f
)
(Bσ − µ) A− Af = 0
⇔ G (N,L, σ, f, µ, A, θ) ≡ NBfσ − 4Lµ = 0
(5)
Equation 5 defines an implicit relation between N and (L, σ, f, µ, A, θ). We
simply write N (L, σ, f, µ, A, θ) this relation. Actually, this relation is even
explicit in the special case where there is no coordination cost (φ(N, d) = 0):
N∗ ≡ N (L, σ, f, µ, A, θ)
∣∣∣φ(N,d)=0 = 4Lµ
fBσ
Even though φ() = 0 is clearly not the most interesting case, it is worthwhile to
note the U-shaped relationship between N∗ and the transport cost parameter
θ. This U -shaped relationship results from two opposite effects:
(1) a direct effect: for a given expenditure in imported industrial goods, a
decrease in θ decreases the resources lost in transport, and thus increases
the producer’s profit, which increases N∗ to restore the zero profit con-
dition.
(2) an indirect effect: when θ decreases, the expenditure in imported goods
increases, thus the resources lost in transport can increase, with a negative
impact on N∗.
Clearly, when θ → ∞, the expenditure in imported goods is virtually nil, so
the second effect is stronger, whereas when θ → 0, the first one dominates.
Of course, the link between θ and N is much more complex when φ() > 0, since
in this case, N is present in B. However, qualitatively, we already can figure
out the difference between our model and Duranton & Storper’s, keeping in
mind that N denotes the complexity of the production process which is the
source of the coordination cost. Whereas the coordination cost tends to vanish
for low values of the transport cost, it tends to strengthen in our model.
Now, to be rigorous, we should prove that the above mentioned phenomenon
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can indeed arise in the model, when φ > 0. The implicit function theorem
applied to equation 5 allows to write the marginal effect of θ on N :
∂N
∂θ
∣∣∣∣∣
pi=0
= −
∂G (.)/∂θ
∂G (.)/∂N
= −
∂B/∂θ(
B/N + ∂B/∂N
)
This effect depends on ∂B/∂θ and ∂B/∂θ, which write:
∂B
∂θ
= d−
(1− σ)
(
τ−
−σ + γ2τ¯−σ
)(
1 + τ−
−σ + 2τ¯−σ
)
+ σ
(
1 + τ−
1−σ + 2τ¯1−σ
)(
τ−
−σ−1 + γ2τ¯−σ−1
)
(
1 + τ−
−σ + 2τ¯−σ
)2
∂B
∂N
=
(1− σ)
(
∂φ
(
N,d−
)
∂N
τ−
−σ + ∂φ(N,d¯)
∂N
2τ¯−σ
)(
1 + τ−
−σ + 2τ¯−σ
)
+ σ
(
1 + τ−
1−σ + 2τ¯1−σ
)(
∂φ
(
N,d−
)
∂N
τ−
−σ−1 + ∂φ(N,d¯)
∂N
2τ¯−σ−1
)
(
1 + τ−
−σ + 2τ¯−σ
)2
Those expressions are not very tractable, but ∂N
∂θ
can be either positive or
negative. Hereafter, we focus on the case where ∂N
∂θ
≥ 0.
The distance puzzle arises, in this model, if a fall in θ results in an increase
in
x−
x¯
, or equivalently, in an increase in τ¯
τ−
. The sign of ∂
(
τ¯
τ−
)/
∂θ, is the same
as the sign of ∂τ¯
∂θ
τ− −
∂τ−
∂θ
τ¯ =
(
d¯+ ∂N
∂θ
∂φ(N,d¯)
∂N
)
τ− −
d− + ∂N∂θ ∂φ
(
N,d−
)
∂N
 τ¯ . This
expression shows that the impact of a fall in θ on
x−
x¯
is undetermined. In other
words, in this model, the distance puzzle can arise.
To illustrate this point, we perform simulations with φ (N, d) = φNd2 (φ ≥ 0)
and the parameters given in table 1.
Table 1
Parameters
Parameter σ µ A L f d− d¯
value 3 0.5 1.2 20 µ/σ 1 4
Figures 2 and 3 represent, respectively, the number of varieties and the ratio
x−
x¯
as functions of θ, for three different values of φ: 0, 0.001 and 0.005. In all three
cases, the number of varieties increases when θ → 0, even if higher values of φ
lowers the slope of the curve 15 . When φ = 0, the increasing complexity does
15 Actually, simulations performed with even higher values of φ result in decreasing
number of firms.
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Fig. 2. N as function of θ
Fig. 3. The ratio
x−
x¯ as function of θ
not impact trade, since this case corresponds to the absence of coordination
cost. So, when θ → 0, full economic integration is achieved, and the ratio
of neighbor to distant exchange tends to 1. For a small value of φ (0.001),
the increasing complexity prevents full economic integration: distance matters
less, but still matters when θ → 0. Finally, with a high value for φ (0.005),
coordination cost is high enough to revert the slope of the curve of
x−
x¯
: distance
matters more with low transport cost. This is the distance puzzle! Goods are
less expansive to trade, more varieties are traded, division of labor is increased.
But this increased division of labor increases the need of coordination, that in
turn increases the importance of distance.
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Concluding remarks
In this paper, we wanted to add a theoretical explanation of the distance puz-
zle. We argue that the introduction of coordination, accounting for contract
incompleteness between upstream and downstream firms, helps to explain this
puzzle. As we wrote in section 1, our model shares both similarities and dif-
ferences with Duranton and Storper’s (2008).
The main similarities are i) the contract incompleteness and ii) the non mono-
tonic relationship between the transport cost and the coordination cost. In
both models, a fall in transport cost allows an improvement in the production
process, but due to contract incompleteness, this improvement results in an
increased transfer cost.
The main differences are i) the mechanism of the improvement of the pro-
duction process: it comes from an increased quality in Duranton and Storper,
whereas in the present paper, it comes from an increased international di-
vision of labor, and thus an increased complexity. ii) the nature of the non
monotonicity is reverted: in Duranton and Storper, the relation is reverted-U
shaped, whereas it is U or J shaped in our model. This difference is somehow
fundamental, because the predicted effect of a fall in transport cost in both
models are opposite for small transport costs. If θ → 0 is considered as the long
run tendency, then both models have opposite long run predictions. Basically,
Duranton and Storper’s result strongly depends on the common modeling of
transaction cost and transport cost. They assume that the loss due to trans-
port is proportional to quality of the traded intermediates. High quality goods
are more expensive to trade, because, they argue, more coordination is needed
for those goods. But a direct consequence of this assumption is that a zero
transport cost leads to a zero transaction cost. So, the main difference with
our model is that we consider two specific functions: one for transport, one for
the coordination cost. When the former is zero, the second needs not be nil.
In this respect, confronting both results leads to a question that is more fun-
damental than the one of the choice between quality and labor division as the
cause of coordination problems: should we believe that globalization has the
same effect to transport cost and to coordination cost? If the answer is yes,
then Duranton and Storper are right to consider that, on the long run, it will
finally lead to a death of distance. If it is no, then the increasing complexity
of production processes allowed by the globalization may, paradoxically, lead
to a distance revival.
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